Interest in the study of domesticated plants increased near the end of the 18th century, mainly because of their economic potential. In the 19th century, there was a new focus on the historical understanding of species, their origin, changes in their distribution, and their evolutionary history. Charles Darwin developed an extended interpretation of species domestication, considering variations, reproduction, inheritance, and modification as standard processes between wild and domesticated organisms. In this context, one relatively neglected aspect was the geographical distribution of (...) domesticated species. Alphonse de Candolle addressed and developed in detail the question of the geographical origin of cultivated plants. Since 1836 Alphonse de Candolle had been studying the topic and obtained evidence that contributed to understanding aspects such as the center of origin, dispersion, competition, selection, and time of domestication. Although Darwin himself admitted that _Géographie botanique raisonnée_ (de Candolle, Alphonse,de. Géographie botanique raisonnée; ou, exposition des faits principaux et des lois concernant la distribution géographique des plantes de l’epoque actuelle, 2ème tome. Paris: Masson.) was of great help to him in the development of his evolutionary theory, the importance of de Candolle’s contribution is seldom recognized. Our purpose is to detail the dialogue between Alphonse de Candolle and Darwin on the geography of domesticated plants, to understand some of the most critical discussions that contributed to the reinterpretation of domestication under the Darwinian proposal of modified descent. (shrink)

The notion that Charles Darwin embraced the German Romantic tradition seems plausible, given the early influence of Alexander von Humboldt. But this view fails to do justice to other scientific traditions. Darwin was a protégé of the Englishman John Stevens Henslow and was a follower of the Scott Charles Lyell. He had important debts to French scientists, notably Henri Milne-Edwards, Étienne and Isidore Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, and Alphonse de Candolle. Many Germans were quite supportive of Darwin, but not all (...) of these were encumbered by idealistic metaphysical baggage. Both Darwin and Anton Dohrn treated science as very much a cosmopolitan enterprise. (shrink)

We performed a critical review of the historiographical studies on biogeography. We began with the pioneering works of Augustin and Alphonse de Candolle. Then, we analyzed the historical accounts of biogeography developed by (1) Martin Fichman and his history on the extensionism-permanentism debate; (2) Gareth Nelson and his critique of the Neo-Darwinian historiography of biogeography; (3) Ernst Mayr, with his dispersalist viewpoint; (4) Alan Richardson, who wrote a microhistory on the biogeographic model constructed by Darwin; (5) Michael Paul (...) Kinch and the ideas discussed in the 19th century about the geographical distribution of living beings; (6) Janet Browne, who highlighted the importance of the pre-Darwinian naturalists; (7) Peter Bowler, who focused mainly on the influence of paleontology on biogeography; (8) James Larson, who looked into the practices of the naturalists of Northern Europe in the late 18th century; and (9) Malte Ebach, who like Larson, was more interested in analysing the practices rather than the ideas of naturalists who studied the geographical distribution of organisms. Finally, these works are compared with each other. There has not been a dominant paradigm in the construction of historical narratives of biogeography; however, they provide a useful context for understanding problems of biogeography that continue to be debated to this day. (shrink)

About 1910 it became customary to call Bergsonism and all related tendencies ‘new philosophy’. This term was designed not only to contrast an apparently revolutionary idea with the classical intellectualism of the Franco-German academic tradition and with the platitudes of a philosophy that affirmed and believed itself to be inspired by positive science; the concept of ‘new philosophy’ was meant, above all, to imply that, starting with Bergson, philosophy intended to change its position in regard to human experience. No longer (...) an explanation from afar of the world and of consciousness, philosophy professed to be henceforth one with this experience; not satisfied to shed light on man and his life, it aspired to become this life, now at the stage of complete self-awareness. It seemed that this ambition constrained the philosopher to renounce philosophy's ideal—to be an exact science—since this ideal is not only inseparable from the idea of an impartial and detached spectator, but also from that of a reality so constituted as to be an object of pure vision. On the other hand, however, to abandon this ideal proved less acceptable than ever. The startling progress of positive science gave birth, or rather rebirth, to the illusion of a total explanation: how then could one admit that philosophy would triumph over its secular uncertainties by drawing away from this brilliant example? The relative failure of Bergsonism is possibly due precisely to the fact that it never was willing to make any clear statement of choice in this matter. (shrink)